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Abstract 
 
In this paper, the author considers the role of actors in re-institutionalising 
employment practices at the subsidiary level. The findings lend support to the 
argument that actors have considerable space to navigate through institutions, 
creatively deploy agencies of institutions and manoeuvre employment practices. 
The research is based on intensive case studies at two Japanese-Chinese joint-
venture manufacturing companies. Both subsidiaries play low-cost production 
functions within the MNCs and develop a core-periphery division of the 
workforce to enforce labour cost control. However distinctive management 
choices exist at subsidiary level to manage the boundaries between the core and 
the peripheral groups of employees. 
Keywords: segmented labour market in China, hukou, agencies of labour 
mobility control, core and peripheral labour, spatial and functional division of 
production 





A key research agenda in international HRM is to understand how “country differences” 
are reflected in the employment practices adopted by MNCs. While researchers 
endeavour to conceptualise country differences from culturalist, institutional and socio-
political perspectives, there has been a long-standing tendency to play down the role of 
“actors” in making sense of country differences and developing employment practices, 
especially at subsidiary level. Some recent studies within a neo-institutionalist 
perspective have started to address actor-institution dynamism by considering the 
“space” allowed for agencies of institutions to promote or restrain isomorphism of 
employment practices (Forsgren, 1990; Heery and Frege, 2006; Morgan et al., 2003). A 
group of scholars taking the political economy approach has gone further by advocating 
the power of actors to influence both institutions and the management of MNCs 
[Almond, et al., 2006; Edwards, et al., 2007; Edwards, et al., 2010; Ferner, et al., 
(2012); Quintanilla and Ferner (2003)].  Following these developments in the IHRM 
literature, the author analyses agency-institution dynamism by considering how actors 
make sense of cross-country variations in labour markets. 
Two actors—the state and MNCs—powerfully shape labour markets. Given that 
the mobility of labour is strongly restrained and regulated by states, the labour market 
shows distinctive national attributes both in economic and institutional terms. Cross-
country variations in labour markets are reflected in the supply and demand of labour, 
skill levels of the working population and intra-nation labour mobility. Employment 
legislations and administration, educational and professional training, and, forms of 
employment relations also show clear national patterns. Such differences, on the one 
hand, shape the way MNCs allocate economic activities between countries, and hence 
employment practices associated with the specific modes of production (Morris, et al., 
2009). On the other hand, MNCs themselves are powerful labour market institutions. 
Their internal labour market often extends beyond country borders. Recruitment and 
selection, transfer of personnel, training and promotion can be done across counties. In 
this sense, managing the boundary between MNCs’ internal labour market and the 
external labour market within a country has become a critical HR activity. Agency-
institution dynamism can therefore be examined in the development of employment 
practices, which draw parameters between the internal and external labour market.  
A number of reviewers have argued that the dominating integrative approach in 
existing IHRM literature (Bartlett and Goshal’s, 1992; Schuler, De Cieri and Dowling, 
1993; Taylor, Beechler and Napier, 1996) is not being able to capture the implications 
of globalised labour markets for managing HRM in MNCs (Edwards and Kuruvilla, 
2005; Li and Sheldon, 2010). For example, Edwards and Kuruvilla (2005) argue that 
studies of IHRM need to be attuned to reflect the dynamics involved in the functional 
division of production and spatial division of labour within MNCs. Following their 
suggestions, the author of this paper focuses on the subsidiary level, where the 
parameter between the internal and external labour markets is redefined. Based on 
intensive case studies at two Japanese MNCs in China, the author highlights 
employment duality in order to achieve numerical flexibility – a division between the 
core and peripheral group among local employees. A closer examination of the 
employment practices indicates different patterns in managing the boundary between 
core and peripheral groups:   




(2) Peripheral group as an extended pool of low cost and disciplined workers.  
Drawing upon the Global Commodity Chain analysis and the Political Economy 
approach, the author argues that different patterns of duality are directly shaped by the 
subsidiary’s projected position in the stratification of production functions within 
MNCs, continuous enforcement of labour mobility control by the local state and its 
agencies, as well as subsidiary managers’ preferences to ally with these agencies to 
control the mobility of labour at the workplace.  
The paper aims to extend our knowledge of the emergent and developmental 
nature of employment practices exercised at subsidiary level. The author chose to study 
the Japanese MNCs in China in order to examine the implications of relocating from an 
established labour market to an emerging labour market. Unlike existing research that 
focuses on possibilities and barriers of transferring established employment practices 
from mature economies to emerging economies, the author asks the question what if 
country differences make the idea of transfer unachievable or undesirable. The key issue 
here is how companies embedded in a relatively homogenous and stable labour market 
(Japan) develop policies and practice to manage their workforce in a relatively diverse 
and mobile labour market (China). The paper shifts attention from merely comparing 
the presence (or absence) of parent employment practices to investigating the 
differentiation of established employment practices and emergence of new patterns at 
subsidiary level. The findings of this paper, therefore, shed light on the meaning and 
functions of employment practices in the subsidiary context, which helps to deepen our 
understanding of the role of subsidiary managers and “extended actors”(Cooke, 2011) 
in shaping the employment practices at subsidiary level. 
Finally, from the methodological perspective, the paper reveals “insider’ views” 
of managing subsidiary practices (Cooke, 2009). Reviewing current approaches of 
theorising international HRM, De Cieri, Cox and Fenwick (2007: 283) suggested that 
“the search for an integrative, all-encompassing theoretical base has led to the neglect of 
diverse voices”. They argued that the ethnocentric approach in interpreting the concept 
of “HRM” risked the explanatory capacity of existing theoretical frameworks and 
suggested the need for more contextualised research. In particular, by including voice 
from subsidiaries, international HRM researchers will be able to “redirect to how and 
why existing practices and disciplines are adopted and adapted” (ibid: 292). Contrary to 
studies based on large scale surveys or interviews with the a few key informants, this 
paper is based on intensive case studies at two Japanese manufacturing plants located in 
Shanghai, China. The author stayed at the companies and collected testimonies from a 
wide range of people working in the subsidiaries: expatriates, local managers, office and 
shop floor workers. They offer important insights of what employment practices 
exercised in the subsidiaries, how the employment practices function at the subsidiary 
setting and why. The author also conducted a handful of interviews with local labour 
bureau officials and employment agents, whose insights offered important triangulation 
of information.  
The paper is organised in six parts: the second section offers a review of existing 
literature on segmented labour market theory, with an emphasis on implications to 
MNCs. The third part explains the research methodology. The fourth part introduces 
context of the study, especially the transitional nature of China’s labour market. The 
fifth part shows the development, function and institutionalisation of different patterns 
of employment practices used by subsidiaries, with particular attention to the analysis 
on employment practices applied to manage the boundary of the internal and external 
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labour markets. The conclusion summarises the key research findings and offers 
suggestions for future research directions. 
Literature Review: Labour market segmentation, international division of 
labour and HRM transfer 
In opposition to neo-classical assumptions of a unified and perfectly competitive labour 
market, labour market segmentation theorists argue that labour markets are composed of 
fundamentally different sectors and movement between sectors is highly constrained 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Atkinson, 1984). Labour markets can be broadly divided 
into primary and secondary sectors, with each further stratified into different tiers. Jobs 
in the primary and secondary sectors possess distinct characteristics. Primary jobs offer 
generous wage and welfare packages, job security as well as training and career 
advancement opportunities with the firms ‘internal labour markets, whereas secondary 
jobs are often paid at the minimum wage level, are insecure and with limited 
opportunities for career development in the firm. The level of job complexity and the 
degree of autonomy allowed to employee discretion also differ between jobs in the 
primary and secondary labour markets. 
Observing that MNCs tend to keep the core functions in the home country and 
relocate the peripheral functions overseas, some scholars suggest the relationship 
between the parent plants and the overseas subsidiaries reflects a core-periphery 
division of labour at an international level (Dedoussis and Littler, 1994; Taylor, 2001; 
Wilkinson et al., 2001). More recent research conducted by Morris, Wilkinson and 
Gamble (2009) included an extended sample of MNCs from different home countries, 
but their findings supported the earlier research and suggested that companies which 
seek to compete by cost minimisation would rarely transfer established home country 
employment practices to subsidiaries. These empirical findings suggest that the 
functional division of production creates a spatial division of labour within MNCs. 
However, before we accept the idea that the global workforce has been interwoven into 
segments of MNCs’ internal chains of production functions, some critical questions 
need to be addressed.   
One question is how local labour market dynamics influence the division of 
labour within MNCs. The new international division of labour thesis tends to overstate 
the homogeneity of national labour markets and play down the dynamics and diversity 
of local labour markets within countries. In reality, population density, unemployment 
rates, unionisation and immigration can vary significantly, which all affect the mobility 
chances of local workers. Variation in the educational infrastructure in the host country 
affects the skill profiles and employability of local workforce. In geographically large 
and politically diverse societies (such as China, India and the US) labour laws and their 
implementation can vary significantly as provincial governments have designated 
legislative and administrative power over employment issues. More importantly, being 
international economic and political agents, MNCs are often found to be engaged in the 
construction of local labour market institutions. In a study of Japanese manufacturing 
plants in new town, Elger and Smith (2005) showed how clusters of Japanese MNCs 
coordinated their labour market policies to maintain the supply of a flexible workforce 
for routine, low-wage jobs. In countries where skill shortage instigate mobility among 
the local workforce, sourcing and maintaining a stable workforce can restrain MNCs’ 
ability to consolidate a labour market segment favourable to them. Li and Sheldon 
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(2010)’s study of the foreign invested companies in Suzhou, China reported the 
poaching of skilled workers challenges firms’ efforts to adopt employment practices to 
build a high-commitment workforce. More interestingly, their study found that foreign 
companies started to build alliances with the local vocational schools to maintain a 
steady supply of low-waged and flexible workers. In other words, MNCs can be seen as 
co-producers of labour market institutions in local settings.  
The related question is: can headquarters of MNCs strategically decide 
subsidiary functions, and consequently the employment practices to be adopted? The 
establishment of employment practices is often an outcome of struggles between agents 
of institutions within and outside MNCs. The common ground for many studies of 
international HRM is their research focus on the corporate headquarters, studying 
MNCs’ rationales of internationalisation, the effectiveness of different organisational 
structures, and the complexity in managing overseas subsidiaries. Such a headquarter-
centred approach plays down the developmental nature of subsidiary HRM and the 
initiatives of subsidiary managers in the institutionalisation of employment practices at 
the local level. As recent studies of international HRM indicate, the development of 
subsidiary employment practices is more than a planned and rationale reaction to the 
competitive, institutional and corporate constraints facing MNCs. Empirical evidence 
suggests that not only production and service units are locally embedded but also that 
they develop local strategies, advantages and functions (Brewster, et al., 2003).  
In their seminal work on why independent companies chose to join in an MNC 
production networks, Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005) show that parent company’s HR 
policies are often implemented in a way to advance subsidiary managers’ interests 
rather than to serve the intended strategic objective designated by the headquarters. 
Since subsidiary managers’ actions are purposeful, their view on the competitive 
advantage of existing employment practices makes institutionalisation of such practices 
in subsidiaries a selective, political and emergent process (Gamble 2010). Following 
such a “bottom-up” view of MNCs, the research focus of this paper is the action and 
choice of subsidiary managers in managing the division of labour. In particular, 
subsidiary managers’ perspective and interests in “upgrading” subsidiary’s function 
within MNCs will have a strong influence on their choice of subsidiary employment 
practices.   
Research design and research methodology 
Taking a case study approach with a mixture of qualitative research methods, the author 
was able to develop a comprehensive understanding of how and why subsidiary 
employment practices were formed, as well as the role of actors in the formation of 
subsidiary employment practices. The fieldwork was conducted in two stages. At the 
first stage, the author spent one month at each plant. Data was collected through 
detached-observation, interviews and archival research at two Sino-Japanese joint 
venture plants in Shanghai, China. Detailed notes were made to record the author’s 
observation and reflections on the employment practices at each plant. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with the subsidiary managers, who were key actors in 
developing subsidiary employment practices. A number of informal discussions 
(Briggs, 1986) with the managers and the workers were held at various venues (such as 
canteens, dormitories and meals). This approach helped to develop a holistic view of the 
multiple realities in the field, as well as to allow new research questions to emerge 
during the research process (Moore, 2011). At the second stage, the author revisited the 
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plants a year later to conduct follow-up interviews. Because the role of actors outside 
the subsidiaries in shaping subsidiary employment practice had emerged as a new 
research theme after the author analysed the data collected from the first stage, semi-
structured interviews were also conducted with the local government officials and 
employment agents to further probe the role of these “outsiders”. The findings revealed 
in this paper, therefore, offer detailed documentation of how managers make sense of 
the difference between home and host country labour markets in developing 
employment practices at the workplace level, .  
Case selection is critical for the construction of research validity in qualitative 
studies (Yin, 1994) and often involves a series of decisions (Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki, 
2011). Given that the aim of this research was to explore how subsidiary managers 
make sense of the segmentation of production functions within MNCs and local labour 
market institutions in developing subsidiary employment practices, the author followed 
a “theoretical” sampling strategy (Eisenhardt, 1991; Buck, 2011). Case selection was 
projected against Morris et al.’s research on Japanese ‘reproduction plants’ in Malaysia, 
which examined how work and employment was organised in the electronic goods 
commodity chain. Two Japanese white-goods manufacturers in China (referred to as 
WG1 and WG2) were selected. Both of the companies can be categorised within the 
low cost segment of their parent companies’ global production networks, manufacturing 
standardised models for the local consumer market. Since model design was centralised 
in the headquarters in Japan, there was on average a 6-month lag between any new 
models being launched in the Japanese market and those being produced in the Chinese 
subsidiary plants. The subsidiaries shared a range of standard contingencies: location, 
company size, age, level of parent companies’ international experiences, product range, 
and production model. At the time the companies were visited, both were in the middle 
of undertaking major business reorientations in the Chinese market. Both were battling 
to integrate more product design functions and upgrade the profile of products 
manufactured in their plants. Alongside this the local labour market experienced major 
changes - details discussed below. Such settings enabled the author to investigate the 
scope subsidiary managers had to develop employment practices to accommodate their 
operations in China.  
The Chinese context: the dynamics of a transitional labour market 
China’s labour market has been in a dramatic transition since the Chinese government 
deepened the market-oriented reform in the early 1990s (Brooks and Tao, 2003; Knight 
and Song, 2005). On the one hand, the state has retreated from owning firms and those 
that are still owned have departed from the dominant danwei (or work unit) system, 
which had offered employees lifetime employment and all social welfare. Companies 
have adopted temporal employment contracts to specify the rights and responsibilities 
of employers and employees. The government monitors (often loosely) the labour 
market through legislation and administration of employment laws. A social insurance 
system, whilst as yet under-developed, is expected to provide employees with social 
benefits that used to be covered by the danwei. The Chinese state no longer employs the 
majority of the working population. However, the state’s control over labour movement 
through the hukou (residence registration) system—a system that divides the rural and 
the urban households by the way social welfare, healthcare, housing assistance and 
education are provided— remains strongly embedded (Liu 2005; Chan and 
Buckingham, 2008). Hukou based labour movement controls have in turn led to 
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structural imbalances in the local labour market and segmentation between employee 
groups (Knight and Song, 2005; Zhang, et al., 2010). 
On the one hand, there is a huge surplus unemployed population in China: 
according to the National Statistical Bureau, the total unemployed urban population was 
71.9 million and total unemployed rural population was 297.3 million by the end of 
2009 (NSBC, 2010). This means that 26.3% of the urban population and 61.3% of the 
rural population remain unemployed. On the other hand, many companies in China have 
reported difficulty in sourcing and retaining skilled workers, engineers, and managers 
(Howard, et al., 2008). There is high turnover among local employees, especially 
migrants and those with scare skills (Ross, 2007). China’s largest head hunter company 
conducted a survey of 26 Chinese cities in 2007. The results indicate that annual labour 
turnover is highest among shop floor workers (31.5%), followed by line managers 
(27.6%) and office clerks (25%) (51JOBS, 2007).  
The hukou system has important implications for the segmentation of 
employment groups in the local labour markets. Downsizing of the SOEs created the 
“40/50” group, who were laid off in their 40s or 50s with some redundancy 
compensation. Total numbers of industrial workers employed by the SOEs went down 
from 149.08 million (59% of total the employed) in 1995 to in 64.20 million (21%) in 
2009 (NBSC, 2010). This group of employees were trained, disciplined and keen on 
finding work again in the rising urban sectors. Their urban hukou status meant that they 
enjoyed some unemployment compensation and reemployment assistance offered by the 
state. The state policy prioritised relocating the “40/50” group to urban employment by 
restraining rural migration into cities (Knight and Song, 2005). Long years of 
employment in the SOEs meant that employers had difficulty training these employees 
to gain new skills or to fit into a different company culture. Hence, this group often 
found themselves in an unfavourable position because non-state owned employers 
preferred younger workers, who were more adaptable and cost-effective (Lee, 2007).  
The second employee group are “peasant workers”. Thirty percent of the peasant 
workers work in the township and village enterprises and the majority of them moved to 
the urban areas for jobs (Chan and Pun, 2010). While peasant workers were often 
referred to as “migrant workers”, to many of them, especially the young generation, 
moving back was not an option because the farm allocated to their rural home could not 
support the whole family. They move between jobs, expecting to settle in cities 
eventually (Chang, 2008). With few qualifications, these migrant peasant workers often 
take up those marginal jobs with low skill requirements in the manufacturing, service 
and construction sectors, which are often characterised by job instability and high 
labour turnover (Chan and Pun, 2010). Once a job is secured, migrant workers can 
apply for temporary urban hukou sponsored by their employer. However, their 
permanent hukou remains non-urban, which means they are not entitled the social 
welfare benefits and employment assistance available to the urban hukou holders.  
The last group of employees that forms the urban workforce are young 
graduates. The legacy hukou system under a planned economy is still evident in the 
hukou arrangement of the university students. When registered as a full-time student, 
he/she is supposed to transfer the household hukou to collective hukou at the university. 
Having a collective hukou means students do not need a temporary urban hukou to take 
on internships or temporary employment in cities. After graduation, the collective hukou 
can also be transferred to the employers, who are allocated annual hukou quota by the 
state (normally public sectors or SOE). Otherwise, graduates have to move their hukou 
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back to their household. Since the expansion of universities has outpaced the demand 
for graduates in urban areas, some graduates find it hard to secure a job that match their 
qualifications and have to take on low-grade jobs. Some university graduates, originally 
from rural areas, choose to dwell in cities, take on low-end jobs, and try advance their 
career by accumulating work experiences.  
This threefold segmentation is a key feature of the Chinese labour market, with 
important implications for MNC HR at the workplace level, as we now go on to discuss.  
Contrasting patterns of employment practices at subsidiary level 
The two Japanese MNCs selected for this study are highly successful white goods 
manufacturers and have built up extensive global production networks since the early 
1980s. The Chinese subsidiary plants, WG1 and WG2, are semi-automated assembly 
lines set up in the mid 1990s to explore the growing Chinese consumer market. 
Throughout the 2000s both subsidiaries were facing major price competition in the local 
white goods market. They were pressed to both reduce production costs and upgrade 
their product profiles. Price competition also forced the companies to reconsolidate their 
“compete by quality” strategy to cater for the rising middle class in China. Faced with 
the unbalanced, mobile and segmented local labour market, the subsidiary managers’ 
main HR concerns were how to maintain workforce flexibility, lower production costs 
and control labour turnover at a “reasonable” level.  
In terms of job design, shop floor work was, overall, highly routinized with 
rather limited skill requirements from the workers. From observations of the work in the 
two plants, the argument that both subsidiaries were playing a low-cost standardised 
production function was confirmed, which meant they were less likely to adopt high-
cost employment practices. However, “commitment-based” employment practices were 
not completely absent from the subsidiary. Only a core group of employees (including 
repatriates, senior local managers, technical engineers and workers with sophisticated 
and multiple skills) were offered above-market-average pay, mid- and end-of-year 
appraisal, job security and career development support. The rest of the employees were 
recruited on a short-term contract basis. The contract length ranged from 3 months to 1 
year. Wage levels were slightly above the local average and monthly bonus tied with 
individual productivity. Training was elementary and had no clear career advancement 
implications. These results correspond with Silver’s (1997) definition of a “lean-and-
dual” model of labour control. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the segments of employee 
groups in WG1 and WG2. However, further scrutiny of employment practices applied 
to different employee groups suggests distinctive patterns of division between core and 
periphery employee groups at subsidiary level. Table 1 summarises the employment 
practices adopted by the subsidiaries and the strategic meaning of these practices at 
subsidiary level.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Prolonged selection – management of the peripheral group in WGI 
WG1’s recruitment and selection policies favoured a younger workforce: the average 
age of employees was 25. The employees were mainly recruited directly after they 
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finished vocational schools or graduated from universities. Vocational school students 
formed the peripheral group of labour and performed semi-skilled jobs. Recruitment of 
the group, however, was by no means done randomly or by recommendation from 
existing workers as in other foreign invested factories in China (Smith, 2003). Most 
employees were channelled through the “Youth Training Centre”, which was set up in 
alliance with the local vocational schools for internship training. These trainees worked 
side by side with contractual workers and become a marginal group. Upon completion 
of the internship, those who performed well would be offered a fixed term contract 
(normally a year) in WG1. Such an internship system hence played both sourcing and 
selection functions. Alongside the technical school students, university graduates were 
brought in under the “managerial candidate” programme to mainly fill-in the shop floor 
team leader and junior manager positions. Based on their performance at work, these 
managerial candidates could be promoted to mid-level positions after working in the 
company for 2 to 3 years. Pay-for-the-job-scale was adopted to specify the connection 
between positions, although reported promotion opportunities were rare. Performance-
based pay, tenure benefits and family allowance were offered to all employees apart 
from the student interns, which indicated the subsidiary’s inclination to encourage 
employees to stay on with the company. A core-periphery divide functioned as a 
prolonged selection process from which the competent and loyal employees were 
retained.   
For WG1, an alliance with vocational schools and universities helped connect 
the firm with an extended pool of candidates, who were inexperienced but 
systematically trained by both the vocational schools/universities and the plant.  Such an 
alliance allowed WG1 to pre-select those “competent” recruits to be integrated into the 
firm’s internal labour market. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Extended Flexibility – management of the peripheral group in WG2 
In sharp contrast, WG2’s core-periphery divide served more a cost-control function, 
with employment policies clearly favouring those with experience. The core employee 
group was formed by workers, managers and engineers who were laid-off from a state 
owned company, which used to be WG2’s parent company. This group of employees 
were on permanent contracts and offered relatively generous salary and bonuses linked 
to the financial performance of WG2. The shop floor workers group was mainly 
migrants, who were given 3-month renewable contracts and would not build tenure in 
the company. During the peak season, more than 80% of the shop floor workers were 
short-term migrants, who were recruited through a number of local employment agents. 
They worked in WG2 on a temporary basis and performed simplified tasks: welding, 
assembling, painting and packing. Very limited training was given to these workers and 
the pay was largely based on their daily output. As the short-term migrant workers 
would return to the agent after short-term services at WG2, the company was not 
entitled to pay any social insurance benefits for this group of workers, which normally 
made up 37% of the employers’ salary bill. At the same time, WG2 chose to recruit 
experienced group leaders, line managers and supervisors, who formed a core group to 
lead the migrant workers on the workshop. No HR policies were available to clarify 
internal promotion policies or to support the migrant workers to gain a permanent 
position. Salary for more experienced employees was not significantly higher than that 
for migrants, but job security was guaranteed for those with experience.  
 
12 
In WG2’s case, it was the local employment agents that played a key role in 
securing abundant, flexible and low-waged labour. Sourcing migrant workers and 
controlling turnover among this group has been reported a challenge to foreign invested 
companies in China (Howard, et al., 2008). The local employment agents are normally 
connected to the regional labour bureaus and collect information of the migrants. They 
also offered discipline training, covering basic insurance and worker grievance 
handling, which allowed WG2 to externalise these employment functions. As the 
demand for agency workers increased, WG2 signed up long-term contracts with a 
number of job centres in order to maintain the numerical flexibility in the firm. As 
explained by the local managers, using different employment agents expanded the 
source of workers and avoided migrants forming alliances based on their hometown. In 
the Chinese context, hometown alliances are common and a key source of solidarity and 
integration for workers (Perry, 1996). Here, an alliance with the employment agents 
enabled the exclusion of migrant workers from WG2’s internal labour market.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Managing core workers 
In terms of managing the “core” group of employees, the two subsidiaries showed more 
similarity in terms of employment policies and practices. Supporting Li and Sheldon’s 
(2010) observation that enduring skill shortage instigate “poaching” of skilled workers, 
both companies reported concerns over losing competent employees and managers to 
their major competitors.  
“There seems to be a routine among the employees. They will join us after working 
for a Korean or a Taiwanese company for several years. Staying here for a while, 
then they move on to European companies.” (Management and Accounting 
Department, WG2, female, Chinese, 33) 
 
“There are some engineers we really want to keep. But they seem to believe that 
they could realize better developments in the European or American 
companies…Maybe this will be counted as our contribution to Chinese society?” 
(HR Department, WG1, male, Chinese, 35) 
As a short-term resolution, WG1 increased the number of expatriates after a trial of 
promoting local managers. They assigned several expatriates subordinate roles to 
“support” the local managers. WG2 introduced an “inpatriation-repatriation” 
programme aimed at developing a cadre of “systematically trained” local managers.  
Knowing the high mobility among the managerial and engineering employees, 
subsidiary managers made use of some retention measures, which were used to generate 
long-term commitment and to exert direct control over the local employees. For 
example, WG2 provided apartments to managers before they purchased their own 
property. This differs from the provision of company housing in the old SOE in the 
sense that it was short-term, contract-based and the company was under no obligation to 
provide accommodation to all the employees. Neither was this policy consistent with 
the parent company practice where company accommodation was considered a form of 
compensation for young employees on low wages. Instead, dormitories not only helped 
retain the managers but also extended their working hours as they were generally 
expected to work voluntary (unpaid) overtime. The workers would leave the premises 
when the 8-hour work shift was over. The managers, by contrast, would normally stay 
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longer and might be called back when there is something that required urgent attention. 
In fact, WG2 did not enforce any policy to persuade staff who had purchased their own 
apartment to move out of the company accommodation. This shows that company 
accommodation served the purpose of providing convenience to managers with 
additional after-work duties rather than compensation to the young low-paid employees. 
One manager’s comments confirmed the different meaning of company accommodation 
between the parent company and the subsidiary: 
“We might be the only [Japanese] company in China having a company housing 
system like an old state owned company… Our company dorms in Japan are for 
single employees and they are very small and they are 1 hour away by train. The 
employees will normally move out of the dorm after 2-3 years. But here, I don’t 
think anyone would move unless they are forced to do so.” (Manager in 
Accounting and general management department, WG2, female, Chinese, 33) 
Besides accommodation, some parent company management practices were also applied 
to control mobility and absenteeism of the managers. WG2 used company mobile 
phones to keep a record of the movement of local managers:  
“The company will retain the list of calls of all the company mobile numbers. We 
sometimes detect that someone applied for sick leave and he/she used the mobile in 
other regions. The ‘sick leave’ then won’t be verified and the person will get a 
deduction.” (Clerk in Administrative Department, WG2, Chinese, female, 36) 
Subsidiary managers explained that these practices took the same form as those of the 
parent companies but were given different interpretation by subsidiary managers. In 
view of the difficulty in cultivating commitment in the local labour market with much 
higher mobility, direct control was presumed to be a viable alternative to the indirect 
control through forming social relationship between employees and the company.  
Distinctive patterns of the core-peripheral divide were also reflected in the route 
through which local managers were promoted. WG1 displayed a strong intention to 
build an internally trained and selected local management team. There was a clear 
statement in the corporate policy to increase the number of local managers in the 
subsidiary management team. A few Chinese managers were promoted to senior 
positions. At the same time, WG1 centralised training of local technical engineers and 
local managers to the China centre in Beijing. A liaison with several Beijing-based 
universities ensured the supply of “high-quality graduates” to join the company 
management trainee programme, which aimed to build a cadre of competent and locally 
trained managers.  However, 50% of managerial candidates chose to leave WG1 after 
finishing the first one-year-contract due to not being able to cope with the intensive 
shop floor work pressures, difficulty in fitting in the work teams or finding better 
employment opportunities. Nevertheless the general principle of hiring fresh graduates 
and promoting internally trained managers remained at the heart of WG1’s promotion 
policy. As explained by the general manager, WG1 were “determined to build a 
workforce that shares the values of the company”. Here, again, an alliance with higher 
education institutions was used to extend the pool of employees into the firm’s internal 
labour market.  
WG2 relied heavily on experienced workers and mid-career managers to form 
the core employee group. More than 70 per cent of the new recruits were in mid-career, 
either from the Chinese parent company or the external labour market. The local 
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managers explained the rationale of the HR policy as a reaction to the mobility 
associated with different groups of workers:  
“We understand that it is faster for the fresh graduates to learn and adapt to our 
company. And we do have some wonderful young graduates working here. But 
they leave soon for better personal development. I think the average length young 
graduates worked for our company is about 2 or 2.5 years. This is not good enough 
for the company. We need our employees to be more responsible and be willing to 
connect their personal development with that of the company, people who believe 
in the company at its prosperity and its setbacks. I think my Japanese colleagues 
agree with me at this point.” (Deputy General Manager, Chinese, 49, male) 
The local senior managers argued that a stable and loyal mid-management team had 
been the key to WG2’s past success. In fact, the turnover among the core group of 
employees was 3%, way below the local average. Once there were vacancies, WG2 
tended to recruit directly from the local labour market and experienced team leaders, 
salesmen, and managers, who were perceived to be more mature and serious employees. 
Many of them had a background of working in SOEs and shared a view of work with 
the senior Chinese managers. Fresh graduates (mostly young migrants) were more 
likely to start with clerical jobs, which were described as “repetitive” yet “stressful”. In 
this sense, segmentation in the local labour market facilitated the solidarity among the 
core group, but also a divide between the experienced urban workers and young and 
inexperienced migrants, and consequently, the latter being excluded from the firm’s 
internal labour market.  
An exception to this pattern was the “inpatriation-repatriation programme”, 
introduced by the Japanese parent company in the late 1990s. The programme allowed 
WG2 to recruit competent young Chinese graduates to join long-term (3 years in WG2’s 
case) on-the-job training in the Japanese parent plants. These trainees were then 
despatched back to various Chinese subsidiaries to fill in mid-management positions. 
Only very limited numbers of employees had participated in the programme and 
managerial positions remained dominated by experienced Chinese managers.  
In summary, employment practices observed at subsidiary level reflected 
different patterns of linking the firm’s internal segmentation of labour to the local 
labour market. The comparison between WG1 and WG2 suggested that distinctive HR 
policies and practices were subsidiary-specific and highly contextual to the management 
team. Subsidiary employment policy and practices were advanced in such a way to 
reflect subsidiary managerial initiatives of labour control. Segmented local labour 
markets, supply and mobility opportunities of different labour market segments and the 
way subsidiary managers interact with the local agencies of labour mobility control 
were found to have enabled such distinctive patterns in dividing (and linking) the core-
peripheral groups of labour at subsidiary level.  
Conclusion 
The paper has explored how the international division of production functions within 
MNCs has influenced (but not determined) the way subsidiaries manage the boundary 
between internal and external labour markets. Both case studies engaged in labour 
intensive production and were highly cost conscious. Both divided employees into core 
and peripheral groups as a measure to control costs. However, segmentation had 
different management objectives in the two cases. In WG1, the peripheral group 
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(student interns and management trainees) were used as an extended pool of candidates, 
from which the core group (regular employees) was selected. In WG2, however, a 
divide was drawn between employees and agency workers,  (migrants) who were 
marginalised and excluded from firm’s internal employment system. The young 
graduates (mostly migrants) were also marginalised, if not completely excluded from 
the firm’s internal labour market. Addressing why subsidiaries developed such different 
patterns of core-peripheral divisions of labour, the author compared the composition of 
employee groups in the subsidiaries and the relationship between subsidiaries and local 
labour supply and development institutions. A supply of diverse groups of workers in 
the segmented local labour market was found relevant for the development of such 
different subsidiary employment practices. Local labour market institutions also played 
a central role in structuring the firm’s internal labour market and the local labour market 
segments.  
What, then, are the implications of these results to the study of international 
HRM in MNCs?  
Firstly, the research findings offer a critique of the existing international HRM 
literature by considering the implications of global division of production functions to 
managing employee at the subsidiary level. The findings lend some support to the view 
that subsidiaries performing standard production will employ low-cost employment 
practices. However, this paper also shows more complexity to employment practices 
developed at the subsidiary level. There was no evidence that subsidiaries were 
converging to a standardised low-cost model. While being in low-end production has 
pressed subsidiaries to extend the use of the peripheral employee groups, the boundary 
between the core (internal) and peripheral (external) labour markets was managed to 
ensure flexibility of the workforce and to retain skills to some extent. Importantly, 
subsidiaries employed distinctive policies and practices to manage different employee 
groups. What is also noteworthy is that some new employment policies and practices 
emerged to accommodate the local labour market institutions. The fact that the MNCs 
relocating production functions from relatively homogenous and mature labour markets 
(Japan) to where external institutional patterns remain fluid and immature (China) 
makes transferring of established employment practices less relevant, and the 
development of new ones more pressing in the local settings.  
Secondly, the results also offer further critique to the contingency approach, 
which suggests that subsidiary management practices should reflect multiple pressures 
faced by MNCs in the internationalisation process. Analysis along a contingency 
approach focuses on the forces within and outside MNCs which shape or direct 
subsidiary management practices. However, the findings of this paper suggest that the 
subsidiary can develop distinctive patterns of employment practices under similar 
external contingent constraints. For example, contrary to the idea that the hukou system 
will automatically create a core and peripheral division of labour at workplace (Knight 
and Song, 2005; Lu 2006; Zhang et al., 2010), the findings of this paper suggest that 
segmentation in local labour market was by and large enacted by actors from within and 
outside the workplace. In the two cases subsidiary managers ended up targeting 
different segments of the local labour market, developing varied recruitment policies to 
maintain a relatively stable source of labour, employed contrasting reward packages and 
adopted different measures to control the mobility of the local workforce. More 
importantly, by building alliances with the agencies of local labour market institutions, 
subsidiary managers were able to extend the resources to secure a sustainable supply of 
labour and to control the mobility of labour. In other words, different patterns of 
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employment practices were co-produced by the agencies of MNCs and local 
institutions. Employment practices within the subsidiary were seldom the direct 
manifestation of institutional, industry sector or organisational pressures faced by the 
subsidiary (Smith, 2005, 2008). Rather differences in subsidiary employment policies 
and practices were locally constructed and reflected strong subsidiary initiatives.  
Finally, the results of this paper are significant because they suggest that local 
labour markets can be linked to MNCs production functions in many different ways. 
While exploring the impact of MNCs global strategy on the different patterns of 
dividing local labour force is beyond the scope of this paper, the findings here lend 
some support to the argument that a firm’s local competitive strategies strongly 
influence subsidiary employment practices (Yao and Wang, 2006; Takeuchi et al., 
2009). Further research is recommended to consider how upgrading of product models 
may affect the contrasting patterns of subsidiary HR policies and practices reported in 
this paper. In particular, researchers need to consider the implication of China’s 
transition from an export-led economy to a consumption-led economy for MNCs 
stratification of production functions into the country and management of employment 
practices at the subsidiary level.  
The author is aware that the study is based on two case studies of Japanese 
MNCs in China and the findings cannot be over generalised. Also, due to resource 
constraints, the author was not able to visit the companies’ Japanese headquarters. The 
voice of the headquarters was heard through the parent company agents, such as 
expatriates.  Instead, the paper revealed the continued importance of subsidiary 
initiatives, thus highlighting the real need for more workplace based case studies to 




Table 1 Comparing employment practices adopted by WG1 and WG2  
 WG1 WG2 
  
Employment practices Strategic meaning to the 
subsidiary management 
team  
Employment Practices Strategic meaning to the 
subsidiary management 
team 
Recruitment and selection Mainly technical school, 
colleague and university 
graduates and some 
experienced engineers  
HR Cost control (Training 
is shortened and 
replacements are easy to 
find) 
Mainly mid-career 
managers and experienced 
workers 
University graduates for 
the “inpatriation-
repatriation” programme 
Control of employee 
mobility; implementation 
of bureaucratic control 




process; In-house skill 
development 
Not much training has 
been given to the mid-





Basic training,  
mainly in-house on-the-
job training, company 
funds for selected 
managers to attend 
professional training 
programmes 
Young graduates joining 
the “inpatriation-
repatriation” programme 
receive long term on-the-
job training in Japan. 
Performance assessment 
and appraisal  
Pay-for-job grade system 
tailored on the basis of the 
Japanese parent company. 
Semi-annual performance 
assessment. 
Assessment criteria are 
based on tenure, merit and 
performance. 
Top-down assessment 
Clarification of promotion 
route 
Pay-for-job grade system 
tailored on basis of the 





with deputy general 
manager making all the 
decisions on regular 
Separation between core 




procedure with senior 
managers deciding 
subordinates’ 
performance results  
employees’ performance 
results 
Retention and dismissal  
 













Monetary and other 
material rewards (such as 
company housing) 














Core group: personnel 
integrated into parent HR 
system (Senior managers: 
expatriates and Chinese 
managers)




administrative staff, workers 
and management trainees)
Marginal group:  temporary 
workers (student interns)
Core Group: personnel 
inetgrated into the parent 
HR system (expatriates 
and repatriates)
Semi-Core Group: 
permanent  employees 
(local managers, senior 
engineers and salesmen)
Peripheral Group :Contracted 
workers (technical, salesmen, 
supervisors, teamleaders and 
administrative staff)
Marginal Group: Agency 
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